India and China have every reason to talk.
They share a long border, a complicated strategic relationship, substantial economic ties and membership in major multilateral forums. Diplomatic engagement between two large neighbours is not weakness; it is statecraft.
But engagement raises a different question when one government’s domestic political prohibitions begin entering the democratic space of the other.
That question has become relevant ahead of the BRICS summit in New Delhi.
ThePrint reported on August 3 that senior Chinese Embassy officials had raised concerns about media access for organisations linked to Falun Gong and Tibet, including the possibility that such journalists could question the Chinese delegation. As summit chair, India controls accreditation and access to the media areas. The report did not establish that India had accepted the Chinese request. ThePrint
Outlook India subsequently reported the issue and quoted the Chinese position: Beijing opposes activities by Falun Gong-linked groups and others that it regards as undermining China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity. Outlook India
That position may make sense within Beijing’s own political framework.
It does not automatically follow that the same framework should operate in India.
What is Falun Dafa?
Falun Dafa, also known as Falun Gong, is a spiritual practice involving meditation, five exercises and teachings centred on Truthfulness, Compassion and Forbearance. Freedom House describes it as a spiritual practice that spread through a loose network of volunteer practice sites in China before the Chinese Communist Party launched a nationwide suppression campaign in 1999. Freedom House
The practice is lawful in India. Indeed, The Times of India has repeatedly encountered it not as an underground political organisation but in ordinary civic settings. TOI’s Bengaluru “Happy Streets” initiative has hosted Falun Dafa meditation sessions in Malleswaram and Whitefield, alongside activities such as Zumba, yoga, pottery and community recreation. Times of India
In Mumbai, TOI has described Falun Dafa as a spiritual discipline involving five meditative exercises and the principles of truthfulness, compassion and tolerance. Times of India
That contrast matters.
What Beijing prohibits in China can be entirely lawful in India.
This is where strategic autonomy becomes practical
India frequently speaks of making foreign-policy decisions according to its own interests rather than simply adopting another power’s position.
The same principle has a domestic dimension.
A visiting government can legitimately request physical security.
It can protest statements it dislikes.
It can refuse to answer questions.
What deserves greater scrutiny is whether it should influence which lawful journalists are permitted to ask those questions in the first place.
That question is especially important because overseas Chinese pressure against Falun Gong is not merely an assertion made by practitioners.
Freedom House describes China as operating the world’s most sophisticated and comprehensive system of transnational repression. Its documented targets include Tibetans, Uyghurs, political dissidents, journalists and Falun Gong practitioners, and it reports that such activity has affected communities in at least 36 countries. Freedom House
Human Rights Watch was documenting the overseas dimension as early as 2002. Its report said Chinese embassy officials had taken on the task of weakening international support for Falun Gong and described diplomatic pressure in several countries following the 1999 crackdown. Human Rights Watch
More recently, the evidence has entered criminal courts.
In 2024, John Chen and Lin Feng pleaded guilty in the United States to acting as unregistered agents of the Chinese government and bribing a purported IRS official as part of a PRC-directed scheme targeting Falun Gong practitioners. The U.S. Justice Department said they worked at the direction of the PRC government. U.S. DOJ
That U.S. case does not prove that anything similar is occurring in India.
It establishes a narrower point: overseas efforts directed against Falun Gong have, in at least some cases, gone beyond diplomatic criticism and become state-directed activity in another sovereign country.
India does not have to choose between engagement and independence
The sensible response is not confrontation for confrontation’s sake.
India can welcome Chinese leaders.
It can provide extraordinary security.
It can continue negotiations on trade, border questions, visas and bilateral relations.
And at exactly the same time it can say, through its actions:
Indian laws determine what may be said in India. Indian institutions determine who may practise a lawful belief in India. And Indian accreditation rules determine which journalists may work in India.
That is not anti-China.
It is the minimum meaning of strategic autonomy.
The unanswered question ahead of BRICS is therefore not whether India should engage Beijing.
It is whether India can deepen that engagement without importing Beijing’s political red lines with it.